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The purpose of this paper is to review the notion of branding and
evaluate its applicability to political parties. As ideological politics is
in decline, branding may provide a consistent narrative where voters
feel a sense of warmth and belonging. The paper aims to build an
understanding of the complexity of building a political brand where
a combination of image, logo, leadership, and values can all contrib-
ute to a compelling brand narrative. It investigates how competing
positive and negative messages attempt to build and distort the brand
identity. A critical review of branding, relationship marketing, and
political science literature articulates the conceptual development
of branding and its applicability to political parties. The success or
failure of negative campaigning is due to the authenticity of a polit-
ical party’s brand values—creating a coherent brand story—if there
is no distance between the brand values articulated by the political
party and the values their community perceives then this creates
an ‘‘authentic’’ brand. However, if there is a gap this paper illustrates
how negative campaigning can be used to build a ‘‘doppelga¨nger
brand,’’ which undermines the credibility of the authentic political
brand. The paper argues that political parties need to understand
how brand stories are developed but also how they can be used to
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protect against negative advertising. This has implications for
political marketing strategists and political parties. This paper draws
together branding theory and relationship marketing and incorpo-
rates them into a framework that makes a contribution to the
political marketing literature.
KEYWORDS branding, political marketing, relationship market-
ing, emotional branding
SinceMay 2005 and theConservative Party’s third general electiondefeat, there has
been a change in leadership that has heralded a change in party identity and
image. Attempts to woo voters back to the Conservatives reflecting the halcyon
days of the Thatcher governments have been unsuccessful—consider William
Hague, Ian Duncan-Smith, and Michael Howard—sales-oriented rather than
market-led. Although the use of marketing tools such as marketing research and
marketing communications have increased, the Conservatives remained locked
in an elite sales-driven campaign strategy (Lees-Marshment 2004). Only recently,
as the Conservative leadership election drew to a close, Andrew Tyrie claimed that
they needed ‘‘a better product to sell’’ (Tyrie 2005). There appears to be a funda-
mental misunderstanding of what the ‘‘Conservative product’’ is, or how Conserva-
tive values and ideology contribute toward the creation of a ‘‘Conservative brand.’’
This is partly due to the problems of applying marketing concepts to politics and
political parties (Lock and Harris 1996)1 but also because the marketing literature
cannot decide onwhat a brand is (Simo`es andDibb 2001; Blumenthal 2004; Jevons
2005). Hence, this paper will critically evaluate the concept of branding and evalu-
ate the application of branding theory to political marketing. The argument will
follow that political branding is more complex than ideology or policies as it also
incorporates leaders, candidates, and party members that personalize the political
offering and also provide symbolic identification through logo and color. Hence,
branding strategiesmayoffer political parties anopportunity build a clear emotion-
al identitywith a clear heuristic device that the electorate can recognize and engage
with in a more meaningful way. Using a combination of relationship marketing
and emotional branding, this paper provides a tentative framework that help
can build an understanding of the problems facing the Conservative Party when
looking to develop a coherent, convincing brand identity. These include building
relationships in a complex political environment, reducing the distance between
the authentic Conservative brand and the ‘‘doppelga¨nger’’ Conservative brand,
and dealing with the impact of negative campaigning.
BRANDING
Brands are ubiquitous; they are all around us, in supermarkets, fashion retail,
services, business to business, and charities. We know them; we recognize
20 D. Dean et al.
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them; they communicate certain values to us; they can, of course, be an effec-
tive heuristic device. So what is a brand? Knox (2004) suggests that a brand is
‘‘an entity that offers customers (and other relevant parties) added value
based on factors over and above its functional performance. These added
values . . . differentiate the offer and provide the basis for customer preference
and loyalty.’’ For Smith (2001), the brand as a value generation mechanism is
crucial in politics, and he suggests that this is twofold: first, loyalty to the
party and, second, image as a heuristic enabling efficient information proces-
sing in electoral decision making. However, the notion and study of branding
has become increasingly complex (Jevons 2005) as the concept is stretched
across sectors far removed from fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) pro-
ducts. We talk about the political product and the political brand; how is this
different? For Kotler and Armstrong (2001), there are three levels: the core
product, the actual product, and the augmented product. These are levels
that increasingly distinguish a product from competitors in the market place;
in short, the brand is a series of values that are over and above generic or
core products in the market place (Meenaghan 1995; Kotler and Armstrong
2001: 294; De Chernatony and McDonald 2002; Morgan, Pritchard, and
Piggott 2002; Palazzo and Basu 2007). Bagozzi (1975) argues that ‘‘people
buy things not for what they do, but for also for what they mean.’’ In politics,
parties and candidates were distinguished from competitors through their
ideological positions. Downs (1957) advanced the argument that political
parties are a means of political shorthand in that they stand for a whole range
of issues on a section of the ideological continuum. His spatial model pro-
poses a left=right one-dimensional space where political parties position
themselves and voters identified with the party closest to them (Whiteley
et al. 2005). For Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974) party identification was influ-
ential and strongly reflected the class base (Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974;
Heath et al. 1985; Rose and McAllister 1990). However, as party identification
declined in both the U.S. and the UK (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Denver
2007) and political parties moved toward the center (Downs 1957; Clarke
et al. 2004:73), we saw the development of ‘‘catch-all parties’’ (Kirchheimer
1966), where there is little ideological space between the parties. Hence,
voters focused upon issues rather than long-term party preferences (Denver
2007:97). Nevertheless, for an issue-based model to be borne out, the voter
must be aware of the issue; hold an attitude toward it; understand the policy
stance of the political parties toward the issue; and vote for the party that
most closely matches his or her view on the issue. But they can be wrong
(Lakoff 2004; MacKuen and Parker-Stephen 2006); they can misunderstand
the issue and also misunderstand which party holds the position closest to
their own position (Kuklinski et al. 2000). The valence model was first articu-
lated by Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974) and developed further by Clarke et al.
(2004), who argued that citizens focused upon universal issues such as
health, crime, and the economy. They claimed that voters did not think about
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politics on a regular basis and made ‘‘rough and ready’’ judgments (Clarke
et al. 2004: 326) based upon heuristic devices such as party leaders. More-
over, ‘‘valenced partisanship,’’ as a store of ‘‘party and party leader perfor-
mances’’ (Clarke et al. 2004:211) served as another heuristic for electoral
choice. Moreover, citizens considered voting for a particular party based
upon their perceived ability to address these valence issues. They concluded
that ‘‘partisanship is fundamentally connected to notions of performance’’
(Clarke et al. 2004:316). This is in line with Smith’s (2001) view of the political
brand, as it provides a heuristic on capability to deliver the political brand
promise on valence issues and, according to Clarke et al. (2004), will then
be able to generate brand or party loyalty.
The relationship consumers have with a brand has been explored in a
number of ways; there is extensive literature on brand loyalty that has been
extended by Fournier (1998), who suggests that a more fruitful alternative to
brand loyalty would be ‘‘brand relationship quality.’’ This takes into consider-
ation the emotional attachment the consumers feel for the brand (see, for
instance, Atkin 2004; Cova and Cova 2002; Lindstrom 2005; and Aaker
1997, among others). This emotional attachment also manifests itself in a
sense of belonging to a particular brand community (Algesheimer, Dholakia,
and Hermann 2005; Cova and Cova 2002). This community generates its own
interpretation of the brand and these should relate to the brand values
espoused by the brand owners themselves. Roberts (2004) suggests that:
[B]rand strategists should focus on telling stories that inspire and
captivate consumers. These stories must demonstrate a genuine under-
standing of consumers’ lifestyles, dreams, and goals and compellingly
represent how the brand can enrich their lives (cited in Thompson,
Rindfleischm, and Arsel 2006).
FIGURE 1 Brand=relationship framework.
22 D. Dean et al.
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Moreover, Schweiger and Adami (1999) argue that ‘‘culture, society, and
social ideas have taken up marketing instruments that create the values of
brand capital.’’ Brands reflect and project contemporary culture (Harris and
De Chernatony 2001; Reeves et al. 2006); they are social objects, socially
constructed by the consumer, creating a personal relationship and sense of
ownership between the consumer and the brand (Muniz and O’Guinn
2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2006; Burnett and Hutton 2007).
In politics, a sense of belonging through party identification has also
been in evidence in the UK, and when ‘‘New’’ Labour were elected they
sought to increase the notion of a brand community through party member-
ship. Emotional branding is built upon a ‘‘consumer-centric, relational, and
story-driven approach forging deep and enduring affective bonds between
consumers and brands’’ (Thompson et al. 2006). This ‘‘brand story’’ creates
a sense of authenticity, believability, and ultimately trust, and in politics these
are crucial values that extend beyond ideology. A political brand story is
richer, as it incorporates the personal characteristics of the candidate or lea-
der who embodies the affective characteristics of the political brand. It is also
more flexible than ideology as it can be adapted, updated, and developed in
line with citizen needs. However, in relational terms this authenticity can be
eroded due to alternative negative stories circulated within the community by
competitors or opponents creating an alternative brand story and a ‘‘doppel-
ga¨nger brand’’ (Thompson et al. 2006). The negative brand story can under-
mine the political brand by creating a series of negative brand attributes that
create a different story; this story also has some notion of authenticity or
believability that is gradually built upon through the media and other sources
such as the opposition and in some cases internal members of the political
party.
The political environment consists of a complex system of positive and
negative relationships just as competitive as the market environment. How-
ever, in consumer marketing the relational aspect of branding has been
extended along the supply chain (Knox 2004). As the development of
relationship marketing continues, the complexity is increased as the brand
owners need to build a brand identity or story that resonates with all stake-
holders such as shareholders, consumers, and suppliers alike (Simo`es and
Dibb 2001). So how can relationship marketing contribute toward a consist-
ent political brand story?
RELATIONSHIP MARKETING
Presented as a panacea to alleviate the marketing ‘‘crisis,’’ relationship market-
ing extended the boundaries of the exchange process familiar in transactional
marketing, and since the 1990s there has been a paradigmatic shift in market-
ing toward ‘‘relationship marketing’’ (Sheth and Parvatiyar 2000). While this
Toward a Conceptual Framework 23
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continues to focus upon the exchange process between the consumer and the
seller, it also recognizes the importance of the nano and macro associations.
Nano relationships (Gummersson 2002) are what Christopher, Payne, and
Ballantyne (1994) defined as the internal market in the six markets model,
and in relationship marketing it is the employee who holds a pivotal relation-
ship with the customer (Varey and Lewis 2000). The organization is structured
in such a way that all employees, whatever their role or position within the
organization, work toward customer satisfaction, delivering the brand prom-
ise. Customer satisfaction is not only the domain of the sales and marketing
departments but also the domain of research and development, human
resources, purchasing, and of course production and quality control. This
interpretation of internal marketing extends the boundaries of the exchange
process and provides a clearer understanding of the interrelationships
between the members of the internal market and the customer.
In politics, however, the internal markets appear to be more complex
than the commercial domain, with the added difficulties related to the levels
of autonomy and hierarchy (Dean and Croft 2001). The strategic task facing
any political movement when building a political brand corresponds in some
ways to that of Christopher et al.’s (1994) marketing equivalent: to ensure
that the citizen receives a coherent message, reiterating the aims and objec-
tives of the organization. The nature of this citizen=candidate relationship
should be in the short term to encourage the citizen to vote at the impending
election, but it should also build sufficient loyalty to ensure continued voting
for the party at later elections. In a successful political campaign, voters are
reassured about a unified political party communicating a coherent message
while it appears that they punish parties they perceive to be disunited (Butler
and Kavanagh 1997; Whiteley 1997). Hence, this emphasizes the need for the
internal market to be ‘‘on message.’’
However, relations among the seller, manufacturer, and suppliers are
also recognized as vital elements in the marketing environment (Easton
and Ha˚kensson 1996). Relationship marketing recognizes that there is a net-
work of players in the market. This defines links between suppliers and man-
ufacturers and how costs can be reduced if this is a profitable relationship.
This notion of relationship marketing has been applied to politics where
the multiple markets model was introduced (Dean and Croft 2001). This
again highlighted the complexity of the exchange process in politics, identi-
fying key players and relationships that were important in order to inform,
influence, and motivate the citizen. This model highlighted the complexities
when developing and maintaining relationships; it recognized that message
controllability became more problematic, and this was dependent upon
the synergy among the stakeholders, political party, and political environ-
ment. Consequently, the creation of the brand story is complex, and in poli-
tics the strategy needs to be more sophisticated (Schewieger and Adami
1999), recognizing the dynamics of the market and also the competitive
24 D. Dean et al.
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environment. So if there is little ideological difference, there needs to be an
emotional difference, and the development of a brand story that underpins
that emotional difference. As a heuristic device, the political brand (complete
with the logo, symbols, values, and brand narrative) are used by citizens
during the electoral process. Moreover, they are personalized through the
political leader, who is the embodiment of the emotional political brand.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
There appears to be a difference between how the political brand is per-
ceived among the electorate. For instance, some have a very limited under-
standing of the brand and what it stands for relying in heuristics; others
engage more heavily in the brand values, understanding how these fit into
their own life words (Dean 2007).
The model developed here is a combination of two models, namely
Roper and Parker’s (2006) conceptualization of the levels of branding and
Payne’s loyalty ladder from relationship marketing theory.
The model has adapted the Roper and Parker model to include the
‘‘core’’ brand but also to recognize that the electorate has both positive
and negative perspectives of political brands. However, this does not suggest
that the applicability of the model is restricted to politics but could also be
applied to the consumer or business to business sectors.
EMOTIONAL POLITICAL BRANDING
The creation of political brand narrative is problematic: First, there is the his-
torical story that needs to be amended or deleted; second, there are the dif-
ferent stakeholders through which the story is told or retold; and finally,
there are opponents who attempt to discredit the story by creating a ‘‘doppel-
ga¨nger’’ political brand.
Political parties need to create a sense of belonging or community;
relationship marketing can help create a community, whether it is real or vir-
tual. Who can forget the sense of euphoria throughout the country when
Labour were elected in 1997, clearly a successful emotional branding strategy
in action. The success of the Labour Party since 1997 has been well docu-
mented by Gould (1998), who argued that motivational research methods
helped the metamorphosis of Old Labour into New Labour, but it was a long
process precipitated by the 1983 election defeat. Gould (1998) identified a
number of negative values that were associated with the Labour Party. The
brand story coming out from the focus groups described a party that had
no understanding of the needs of their core voters, that had lost its identity,
and whatever identity it had was strongly associated with nationalization,
public ownership, and trade unions (Bartle 2002), factors that were
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discredited by the Thatcher government. Following the 1979 and 1983
election defeats that ‘‘traumatized Labour’’ (Wring 2005), Neil Kinnock was
elected leader and embarked upon a ‘‘new professionalism’’ (Wring 2005).
Through research (Radice 1992, 1993, 1994; Gould 1998), the modernizers
sought to develop a new brand story that was modern and eschewed the tra-
ditional Labour principles such as the Trade Union Block vote and Clause IV.
They began a process of building an emotional brand story, one that empha-
sized a compassionate side, one that was capable, responsible, and trust-
worthy. Labour also sought to present their leader Neil Kinnock in a very
personal party election broadcast (PEB) later called Kinnock–The Movie; this
emotional PEB was designed to build brand narrative around the leader,
highlighting his strength—taking on the more left wing extremists; his work-
ing class background—emphasizing that he was the first Kinnock to go
to university; and showing his ‘‘leadership and vision’’ (Wring 2005: 96).
However, building an emotional brand is not something that can be done
overnight, as Gould (1998: 295) noted: ‘‘Campaigns now go on not for just
weeks but for years’’—they were in for the long haul. So even as ‘‘Labour
entered the 1992 election with transformed policies, a more attractive image,
a substantially changed organization, and a good chance of victory’’ (Butler
and Kavanagh 1992:44), the successful election of John Major indicated that
the voters had not bought into the Labour brand story. It is this buy-in that
separates the ‘‘presented’’ brand from the ‘‘authentic’’ brand. So the historical
story was changed, substantive party reorganization occurred, building
a more attractive image, but what was stopping the brand moving from
presented brand to authentic brand?
The failure of Labour under Neil Kinnock’s leadership was due to a dop-
pelga¨nger Labour brand, another negative version of Labour that chipped
away at the repositioned ‘‘Labour’s changed.’’ These were the barriers to
voting Labour: old fashioned nationalism, high taxation, and unilateralism
(Butler and Kavanagh 1992:46). These perceptions emphasized that Labour
was principally ‘‘unfit to govern’’ and ‘‘worse than the Tories’’ and that
Kinnock lacked the necessary ‘‘prime ministerial gravitas’’ (Bartle 2002). In
the political environment there are a variety of sources through which the
voter is exposed to the message; the extent to which a political party can con-
trol the interpretation of the message depends upon how much those sources
have bought into the presented brand. The stakeholders necessary for elec-
toral success have been outlined by Dean and Croft (2001), and these range
from business to trade unions to opposition to media to the internal market,
but in the 1980s there was a dramatic resurgence in satirical entertainment
coupled with nascent development of the Internet. However, negative mes-
sages came from a number of sources serving to undermine Labour, including
the birth of negative websites (Croft and Dean 1997; Dean and Cox, 2000)
deriding Kinnock as a ‘‘windbag,’’ turning his strength of oratory into a weak-
ness. Although they had managed to shake off the shackles of the ‘‘winter of
26 D. Dean et al.
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discontent,’’ miners’ strike, and the three-day week, the prevailing story that
remained was that of the ‘‘loony Left’’ (Shaw 1994; Wring 2005). However, this
affected not only the Labour brand but also the Kinnock brand, culminating in
the infamous Sun headline the night before the 1992 election ‘‘If Kinnock wins
today will the last person in Britain turn out the lights’’ (Toye and Gottlieb
2005: 182), effectively ending the Kinnock leadership.
The internal market of the Labour Party was transformed during Neil
Kinnock’s leadership, becoming increasingly autocratic with the role of the
National Executive Council (NEC) and membership-driven mechanisms such
as conference participation in policy development significantly reduced
(Seyd 1992:92). However, Bartle (2002) argues that while this was supported
by the majority in order to gain office, there was considerable opposition
from traditional Labour members. In a brilliant branding coup, traditional
Labour members were corralled into the ‘‘Old Labour’’ pen (Seyd 1992:82)
along with all the electorally unpopular Labour policies. Hence the Old
Labour brand was isolated from the pristine New Labour project and was
to take much of the blame for the electoral failure in the late 1970s and
1980s (Brown and Coates 1996). This was not just an electorally sensitive
political strategy, it was long-term plan to create a clear distance between
Old and New Labour. All the negative aspects of Labour that were perceived
to be the obstacle to electoral success (Gould 1998) were removed from the
New Labour brand, which gave them an untainted brand to present to the
electorate. When Tony Blair was elected leader and modernization began
in earnest, they needed a story that said they were economically competent,
or in valence terms, more competent than the Conservatives. Blair embarked
upon a series of initiatives to distance New Labour from Old embracing the
‘‘free market and the private sector’’ (Wring 2005:138), dropping Clause IV.
They successfully changed the Labour brand story, building a New Labour
brand that was believable and ultimately electable.
They also needed to disseminate the economically competent story
effectively, and that meant getting the media and the city on board. As Patri-
cia Hewitt explained (cited in Gould 1998), ‘‘what was going to matter on
television was the pictures—for each day there will be a theme and the pic-
tures will be tied to the theme.’’ There needed to be a coherent presentation
throughout all media activity, even down to dress, all were ‘‘on message’’ to
avoid any gap between the authentic and presented brand.
There was a consistent effort to define the New Labour brand as distinc-
tive from the Labour Party that was associated with trade unions, nationaliza-
tion, and the ‘‘looney Left’’ (Gould 1998). Within popular culture the
prevailing perception of Labour’s brand identity was associated with
‘‘extremism and disunity’’ and a feeling that ‘‘no one knew what the Labour
Party actually stood for’’ (Davies 1996:416). Through the media, the Con-
servative Party capitalized on this, reiterating and reinforcing the popular
notion of Labour’s mismanagement of the economy (Wring 2005:114; Shaw
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1994:184), in effect creating a doppelga¨nger Labour brand. However, it was
New Labour that was complicit in the development of this doppelga¨nger
brand, even giving it the brand name of Old Labour. It was associated with
all the negative connotations, while New Labour was presented as a brand
new brand.
LESSONS FOR THE CONSERVATIVES
This paper does not suggest that the Conservatives merely adopt the
approach by the Labour Party, as there are significant differences both in
contextual terms and organizational structure. However, changes did need
to be made. At the Conservative Party Conference in 2002, Theresa May
famously described the Conservatives as a ‘‘nasty party’’ that was out of touch
with the needs of the voters. They were too narrow in their ‘‘focus and their
sympathies’’; in short, their brand story did not resonate with the aspirations
of the voters. At this time, there was an urgent need to change the image and
the brand story of the Conservatives. However, when repositioning a polit-
ical brand there are number of factors that need to be considered, such as
the party loyalists, existing core values, new or repositioned core values,
and change in ideological position. Crucially, as Labour’s struggle to build
an authentic brand story has indicated, it is a long-term strategy.
A new leader can provide impetus to generate a new focus, and it is
interesting to note that the party leader appears to be easier to position than
the party itself. David Cameron has been positioned as young, caring,
family-focused, and environmentally aware. It appears that they are building
these values into the Conservative brand story, shaping issues in the light of
these values. Moreover, they have been at great pains to suggest the prov-
enance of these values is right at the heart of traditional Conservative ideol-
ogy (Norton 2008), which implies consistency over time and a long-term
strategy. Introducing the notion of ideology here is important to the Con-
servative brand as this implies some historical standard that has guided Con-
servative values, although ironically the Conservative Party has always been
too pragmatic to be burdened by anything as specific as an ideology (Blake
1985). For some time now, New Labour has been criticized for short-term,
quick-fix solutions to problems, while Conservative Party policies are ‘‘built
to last’’ (www.conservatives.com). They focus on the valence issues that are
Conservative strengths—building a traditional Tory story that resonates with
their target voters, for instance, home ownership, family (in all its many
guises), and quality of life—factors they can claim historical competence.
However, this needs to be built around a core principle that is derived from
the Conservative tradition. There needs to be a common thread that links
policies together, and the notion of ‘‘conserve’’ is a core value that has tra-
ditionally resonated throughout Conservative policy (Norton 2008). Hence,
28 D. Dean et al.
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as policies are developed in preparation for the next general election,
‘‘conserve and protect’’ are values that can be applied to the environment,
the economy, society, and foreign policy.
Although there is a temptation to attack Labour for being distrustful and
the ‘‘cash for peerage’’ issue, the Conservatives are still too closely associated
with sleaze avoid a counterattack (notwithstanding the recent revelations in
the Daily Telegraph of MPs’ expenses). Although imitation is the sincerest
form of flattery and despite Cameron’s mischievous taunt to be the ‘‘heir to
Blair,’’ the Conservative party cannot become a ‘‘me too’’ Labour party; they
cannot copy Labour’s strategy of distinguishing New Labour from Old. This
would be perceived as short-term with no real direction; a fundamental qual-
ity for a successful leader is to demonstrate vision and an understanding of
strategy coupled with the decisiveness required to engage in this strategy.
In sharp contrast to the New Labour project that jettisoned ‘‘Old Labour’’
values, the Cameron Conservative Party is a modern Conservative Party with
the rhetoric of ‘‘Conservative means, progressive ends’’ (Cameron 2010a).
They emphasized the origin of their progressive credentials with a lineage
dating back to William Wilberforce (Anonymous 2008), emphasizing heritage
with traditional compassionate values that enables them to deal with the
complex issues of today in a caring, competent way (Cameron 2010b). With
this in mind, the Cameron leadership sought to attract younger voters with
‘‘soft’’ policies such as ‘‘Hug a Hoodie’’ (Hinsliff 2006) and other
headline-grabbing initiatives. Ironically ‘‘Hug a Hoodie’’ was given strong
support by Norman Tebbit, a renowned right-winger (Carlin 2006). So the
modern Conservative brand has a radical, progressive agenda (Cameron
2009b) that is fiscally responsible and compassionate and, as David Cameron
claimed, ‘‘The Conservative Party is back and it’s back where it belongs—in
the center ground of British politics’’ (Cameron 2010a). Not only had
Cameron moved the Conservatives back to the center ground, he also tried
to present the Tory brand as inclusive rather than exclusive (Cameron
2010b). This was the biggest hurdle the Conservatives faced; they are seen
as ‘‘for the rich,’’ ‘‘looking after big business,’’ and ‘‘fat cats’’ (Dean 2007).
Hence, the idea that the Conservatives can be an inclusive party that can look
after the interests of the middle classes is in stark contrast to the perception of
many of the middle class citizens they are hoping to attract.
This is the Achilles heel of the Conservatives. They have devoted con-
siderable time presenting ‘‘progressive Conservatism’’ as fair, equal, empow-
ering, and green (Cameron 2009a), but this story has not yet been bought
into. Moreover, the attempt to build the ‘‘progressive Conservative’’ brand
story has been attacked on two fronts. First, the Labour government has car-
icatured David Cameron and his team as ‘‘toffs,’’ reinforcing the ‘‘exclusive’’
perceptions of the party. During Prime Minister’s Questions, Gordon Brown
responded to questions on economic policy by criticizing Conservative tax
policy. He queried whether it was ‘‘services for the many or inheritance tax cuts
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for the few?’’ and that ‘‘their inheritance tax policy seems to have been dreamed
upon the playing fields of Eton’’ (Brown 2009). Alan Johnson (2009) under-
pinned this message, claiming that ‘‘The Conservatives are the party of inherited
wealth, private education, and conspicuous affluence.’’ Some sections of the
media have reiterated this through satirical cartoons and editorials, again con-
tributing toward the Doppelganger brand construction. Second, attacks come
from the internal market, where Conservative MPs such as John Stanyers are
so disillusioned that they have joined UK Independence Party (UKIP). Other dis-
gruntled Thatcherite loyalists have also criticized the Cameron leadership
through tradition communication channels (see, for instance, Hitchens 2010),
as well as twitter and blogs. The extent to which blogging has an effect upon
the political brand needs further research, but it is evident that the stories ema-
nating from these sites do find their way into peoples’ attitudes and interpret-
ation of the brand story (Dean and Cox 2000). However, since the Brown
ascendancy to prime minister, the opinion polls showed an improvement in atti-
tudes towards the Conservatives indicating that possibly their brand story was
beginning to resonate with voters. Nevertheless, the British general election of
2010 illustrated that the electorate was not sufficiently convinced about the
Cameron Conservative Party
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Within the political environment, the difficulties of creating an authentic
political brand are diverse: first, the crucial aspect of dealing with the com-
plexity of the political network and relationship marketing; and second,
developing a political brand that shares voters’ aspirations and gives them
something to believe in. The success of a political party is measured by
the effectiveness of the political brand—by its perceived capability to deliver
on those valence issues identified. There needs to be consistency between
presented brand and the brand perceived by the voters. If Conservative Party
brand is not perceived to be authentic, merely a ‘‘presented’’ brand, then this
provides an opportunity for the opposition to create a doppelga¨nger brand.
Further research is required in determining how the authentic political
brand is created in the voters’ minds and how they build up this picture.
Further research is also required into how the brand is undermined, in what
situation this occurs, and at what rate the doppelga¨nger brand grows. This
has implications for electoral decision making, as an understanding is needed
about how people actually form opinions about political parties; it appears
there is less cognition than previously accepted. The conceptual framework
needs to be developed and tested further to identify when and where the
doppelganger brand emerges and its strength, believability, and authenticity.
This is significant, as we see the growth of alternative personalized
political communications tools. Building and protecting the authentic brand
30 D. Dean et al.
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is paramount, but as Thompson et al. (2006) argue, the doppelga¨nger brand
can provide an indication of where the problems lie. By monitoring the polit-
ical brand stories, political parties are able to identify where the problems
may lie. This is why Gordon Brown should be looking at New Labour’s
doppelga¨nger brand created on his watch.
NOTE
1. The extent to which marketing has be applied to politics still requires further consideration but is
beyond the scope of this paper, which will just focus upon branding theory.
REFERENCES
Aaker, J. L. (1997). Dimensions of brand personality. Journal of Marketing Research,
34(3), 347–356.
Algesheimer, R., U. M. Dholakia, and A. Hermann. (2005). The social influence of
brand communities: Evidence from European car clubs. Journal of Marketing,
59(3), 19–34.
Anonymous. (2008). Commentary: The return of the Tories. Political Quarterly,
79(3), 297–299.
Atkin, D. (2004). The culting of brands: When customers become true believers.
London: Penguin.
Bagozzi, R. P. (1975). Marketing as exchange. Journal of Marketing, 39(4), 32–39.
Bartle, J. (2002). Political developments 1997–2001. In S. Atkinson, J. Bartle, and
R. Mortimer (Eds.), Political communications: The general election of 2001
(pp. 3–39). London: Frank Cass.
Blake, R. (1985). The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher. London: Fontana.
Blumenthal, D. (2004). For the end of brand balderdash—and the beginning of a real
future. Journal of Brand Management, 11(3), 177–179.
Brown, G. (2009). Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, December 2.
Brown, M. B., and K. Coates. (1996). The Blair revelation: Deliverance for whom?
Nottingham: Spokesman.
Burnett, J., and R. B. Hutton. (2007). New consumers need new brands. Journal of
Product and Brand Management, 16(5), 342–347.
Butler, D., and D. Kavanagh. (1997). The British general election of 1992. London:
Macmillan.
Butler, D., and D. E. Stokes. (1969). Political change in Britain: The evolution of
electoral change. London: Macmillan.
Butler, D., and D. E. Stokes. (1974). Political change in Britain: The evolution of
electoral change. London: Macmillan.
Cameron, D. (2009a). Making Progressive Conservatism a reality. Retrieved from
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/01/David_Cameron_
Making_progressive_conservatism_a_reality.aspx
Cameron, D. (2009b). Fiscal responsibility with a social conscience. Retrieved from
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/03/David_Cameron_Fiscal_
Responsibility_with_a_Social_Conscience.aspx
Toward a Conceptual Framework 31
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ott
ing
ha
m 
Tr
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
4:3
2 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Cameron, D. (2010a). The real choice in British Politics. Retrieved from http://
www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2010/02/David_Cameron_The_real_
choice_in_politics.aspx
Cameron, D. (2010b). Fiscal responsibility with a social conscience. Retrieved
from www.conservatives.com/news/speeches/2009/03/david_cameron_fiscal_
responsibility_with_a_social_conscience.aspx
Carlin, B. (2006). Tebbit backs Cameron’s Hug a Hoodie call. Telegraph, July 14.
Christopher, R., A. Payne, and D. Ballantyne. (1994). Relationship marketing.
London: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Clarke, H. D., D. Sanders, M. C. Stewart, and P. Whiteley. (2004). Political choice in
Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cova, B., and V. Cova. (2002). Tribal marketing: The tribalisation of society and its
impact on the conduct of marketing. European Journal of Marketing, 36(5=
6), 595–620.
Cox, V., and D. M. Dean, (2000, July). Striking a Chord or Merely Ignored? An empiri-
cal study into the design features of English Political Websites. Working paper
for the Academy of Marketing Conference, Derby.
Croft, R., and D. M. Dean, (1997, July). Integrated or Overrated: Political Marketing
on the Internet. Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference on Marketing with-
out Borders, Academy of Marketing, Manchester.
Dalton, R. J., and Wattenberg, M. P. (2000). Parties without partisans: Political
change in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Davies, A. J. (1996). To build a new Jerusalem. London: Abacus.
De Chernatony, L., and M. McDonald. (2002). Creating powerful brands. Oxford:
Butterworth-Heinemann.
Denver, D. (2007). Elections and voters in Britain (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper Row.
Easton, G., and H. Ha˚kensson. (1996). Marketing as networks: Editorial introduction.
International Journal of Research into Marketing, 13, 407–413.
Fournier, S. (1998). Consumers and their brands: Developing relationship theory in
consumer research. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 343–373.
Gould, P. (1998). The unfinished revolution. London: Little Brown.
Gummerson, E. (2002). Total relationship marketing (2nd ed.). London:
Butterworth-Heinemann.
Harris, F., and L. De Chernatony. (2001). Corporate branding and corporate brand
performance. European Journal of Marketing, 35(3=4), 441–456.
Heath, A., Jowell, R., and Curtice, J., (1985).HowBritain votes. Oxford, UK: Pergamon.
Hinsliff, G. (2006). Cameron softens crime image in ‘hug a hoodie’ call. Observer,
July 9.
Hitchens, P. (2010). The Cameron delusion. London: Continuum.
Jevons, C. (2005). Names, brands, branding: Beyond the signs, symbols, products
and services. Journal of Product and Brand Management, 14(2=3), 117–118.
Johnson, A. (2009). Warrior Alan Johnson charges at Tory ‘hell-raiser toffs.’ Sunday
Times, December 20.
32 D. Dean et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ott
ing
ha
m 
Tr
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
4:3
2 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The transformation of the Western European Party Systems.
In J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (Eds.), Political parties and political develop-
ment (pp. 177–199). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Knox, S. (2004). Positioning and branding your organisation. Journal of Product and
Brand Management, 13(2=3), 105–115.
Kotler, P., and G. Armstrong. (2001). Principles of marketing (9th ed.). New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall.
Kuklinski, J. H., Quirk, P. J., Jerit, J., Schweider, D., and Rich R. F. (2000). Misinformation
and the currency of democratic citizenship. Journal of Politics, 62(3), 790–816.
Lakoff, G. (2004). Don’t think of an elephant: Know your values and frame the
debate. London, UK: Chicago University Press.
Lavine, H., and T. Gschwend. (2006). Issues, party and character: The moderating
role of ideological thinking on candidate evaluation. British Journal of Political
Science, 37, 139–163.
Lees-Marshment, J. (2004). Mis-marketing the Conservatives: The limitations of style
over substance. Political Quarterly, 75(4), 392–397.
Lindstrom, M. (2005). Brand sense: Sensory secrets behind the stuff we buy.
New York: Free Press.
Lock, A., and P. Harris. (1996). Political marketing—vive la difference! European
Journal of Marketing, 30(10=11), 21–31.
MacKuen, M. B., and Parker-Stephen, E. (2006). Anxiety, enthusiasm and the vote:
The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement during presidential
campaigns. America Political Science Review, 87(3), 672–685.
May, T. (2002). Retrieved from http://politics.guardian.co.uk/tories2002/story/
0,,806370,00.html
Meenaghan, T. (1995). The role of advertising in brand image development. Journal
of Product and Brand Management, 4(4), 23–34.
Morgan, N., A. Pritchard, and R. Piggott. (2002). New Zealand, 100% pure. The cre-
ation of a powerful niche destination brand. Journal of Brand Management,
9(4=5), 335–354.
Muniz, A. M., and T. C. O’Guinn. (2001). Brand community. Journal of Consumer
Research, 27(4), 412–432.
Norton, P. (2008). The future of conservatism. Political Quarterly, 79(3), 324–332.
Palazzo, G., and K. Basu. (2007). The ethical backlash of corporate branding. Journal
of Business Ethics, 73(4), 333–346.
Radice, G. (1992). Southern comfort. Fabian Society Pamphlet.
Radice, G. (1993). More Southern comfort. Fabian Society Pamphlet.
Radice, G. (1994). Any Southern comfort. Fabian Society Pamphlet.
Reeves, P., de Chernatony, L., and Carrigan, M., (2006). Building a political brand:
Ideology or voter-driven strategy. Journal of BrandManagement. 13(6), 418–428.
Roberts, K. (2004). Lovemarks. New York: Powerhouse Books.
Schweiger, G., and M. Adami. (1999). The nonverbal image of politicians and
political parties. In B. I. Newman (Ed.), The handbook of political marketing
(pp. 347–364). London: Sage.
Seyd, P. (1992). The great transformation. In A. King, I. Crewe, D. Denver,
K. Newton, P. Norton, D. Sanders, and P. Seyd (Eds.), Britain at the polls,
1992. Chatham: Chatham House.
Toward a Conceptual Framework 33
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ott
ing
ha
m 
Tr
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
4:3
2 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Roper, S., and C. Parker. (2006). Evolution of branding theory and its relevance to
the independent retail sector. The Marketing Review, 6, 55–71.
Rose, R., and McAllister, I. (1990). The loyalties of voters. London: Sage.
Shaw, E. (1994). The Labour Party since 1979: Crisis and transformation. London:
Routledge.
Sheth, J. N., and A. Parvatiyar (Eds.). (2000). Handbook of relationship marketing.
London: Sage.
Simo`es, C., and S. Dibb. (2001). Rethinking the brand concept: New brand orien-
tation. Corporate Communications, 6(4), 217–224.
Smith, G. (2001). The general election: Factors influencing the branding image of
political parties and their leaders. Journal of Marketing Management, 17(9=
10), 1058–1073.
Thompson, C. J., A. Rindfleischm, and Z. Arsel. (2006). Emotional branding and
the strategic value of the Doppelga¨nger brand Image. Journal of Marketing,
70, 50–64.
Toye, R., and J. Gottlieb. (2005). Making reputations: Power, persuasion and the
individual in modern British politics. Tauris.
Tyrie, A. (2005). Rebranding isn’t enough. We need a better product to sell.
Guardian, November 3.
Varey, R., and B. Lewis. (2000). Internal marketing. London: Routledge.
Whiteley, P. (1997). The Conservative campaign. In P. Norris and N. T. Gavin (Eds.),
Britain votes 1997. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whiteley, P., M. C. Stewart, D. Sanders, and H. D. Clarke. (2005). The issue agenda
and voting in 2005. Parliamentary Affairs, 58(4), 802–817.
Wring, D. (2005). The politics of marketing the Labour Party. Basingstoke: Palgrave
McMillan.
AUTHOR NOTES
Dianne Dean teaches at the Hull University Business School, concentrating
on political marketing and consumer behavior. She completed her PhD at
the University of Stirling, specializing in politics. She has published a number
of papers on political marketing, particularly on consumption of politics and
relational approaches to political marketing.
Robin Croft is reader at the University of Bedfordshire, and his research
interests focus on the role of personal and non-personal narrative in politics.
He is also a specialist in network marketing and the role of interpersonal
communication in electronic media.
Christopher Pich is a researcher at the Hull University Business School
and his research focuses on political marketing, political branding, and the
Conservative Party.
34 D. Dean et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ott
ing
ha
m 
Tr
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
4:3
2 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
